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No area of organizational life is more vulnerable to failure than group decision-
making.  There are numerous articles, books, and management courses with procedures 
that promise to somehow indemnify the success of group decisions.  Unfortunately, such 
attempts often fail because they overlook an essential truth, that decision-making remains 
a very human process and as such is subject to human error.  The groupthink theory 
addresses these underlying psychological factors that can break a successful group 
decision. 
This study will use a process theory to determine if groupthink characteristics are 
present.  Four different survey instruments will be used to look at all of the variables of 
the groupthink phenomenon.  Military units, which have been identified as having a 
cohesive group structure, will be surveyed.  The results of the surveys will be analyzed, 
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along with observations from external observers, as to whether the symptoms of 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Introduction to Groupthink Phenomenon 
 
In 1961 a special advisory committee to President John F. Kennedy planned and 
implemented a covert invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.  Even though the group spent 
hundreds of hours working out the details of the attack, the invasion was a total disaster. 
The entire attacking force was killed or captured within days, and the U.S. government 
had to send food and supplies to Cuba to ransom them back (Janis, 1982).  
Why, Irving Janis wondered, would a group of top military and government 
leaders make such a terrible decision?  Intrigued by this infamous failure, Janis initiated a 
series of extensive case studies of various decision-making groups.  Each of these 
military or governmental groups included top-quality personnel; most had been picked 
for their intelligence, their dedication, and their outstanding decision-making skills.  Yet 
when they gathered together in a group, something happened.  To paraphrase Carl Jung, 
the individually clever heads became one big nincompoop (“Decision making in groups,” 
2000). 
Janis concluded that the members of these groups experienced groupthink, a 
distorted style of thinking that renders group members incapable of making a rational 
decision.  Janis (1982, p.9) made several statements that could be considered as 
definitions of groupthink: (a) It is “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they 
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members striving for unanimity 
override their motivations to realistically appraise alternative courses of action”; (b) “a 
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from 
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in-group pressure”; and (c) “a concurrence seeking tendency.”  To Janis, groupthink is a 
disease that infects healthy groups, rendering them inefficient and unproductive. 
The basic idea is that small, highly cohesive decision-making groups could 
unconsciously undermine their basic mission of problem solving in order to preserve the 
cohesive social structure of the group.  That is, the human resource maintenance task is 
favored over the performance task.  Such displacement results in the group’s failure to 
follow good decision-making procedures, making success unlikely.  Janis argued that 
groupthink was caused by three antecedents: (a) group cohesiveness; (b) structural faults, 
such as the insulation of the group and lack of impartial leadership; and (c) provocative 
situational context characterized by high task stress and temporary low self-esteem and 
self-efficacy.  Although the second and third antecedents are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to cause groupthink, group cohesion is necessary but not sufficient (Mohamed 
& Wiede, 1996). 
Janis (1982) attempts to explain why groupthink occurs by referring to one of the 
antecedents: stress.  As group members realize that extensive external and internal threats 
accompany their consequential task, the level of stress rises.  The desire to reduce stress 
motivates concurrence-seeking behavior.  Although feelings of internal and external 
threats lead to the same outcome, the psychological process for each source of threat is 
different.  External threats caused by inter-group rivalry call for intra-group solidarity, 
which requires members to comply with whatever norms the group shares.  These norms 
will include the least objectionable decision alternative or the one being advocated by the 
leader.  Internal threats caused by the existence of a moral dilemma or fear of recurring 
failures lower self-esteem.  Members cope by “trying to reassure themselves … that ‘you 
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can’t make an omelet without breaking some eggs’ ” (Janis, 1982, p. 255).  This 
reassurance is referred to as internalization.  When internal conflict or stress distorts 
decision making in individuals, the process is referred to as defensive avoidance; when it 
occurs in groups, it is called groupthink (Janis & Mann, 1977). 
As to the question of who is susceptible to groupthink, Janis (1982) adopts the 
assumption that all policy makers are vulnerable, irrespective of their personality 
characteristics and predisposition on the situation; therefore, the person is not the 
determinant of the groupthink syndrome.  Consequently, Janis argues that groupthink 
cuts across national boundaries and economic sectors; it is not an American or 
government phenomenon. 
Statement of the Problem 
To develop a reliable assessment process for determining if groupthink 
characteristics are present in a military unit. 
Purpose of this Research 
The importance of understanding this phenomenon and the justification of interest 
in this matter are that many important political and business decisions are currently made 
in groups.  Many organizational decisions are made under high-pressure conditions that 
could result in serious consequences if a faulty solution is derived.  In other words, these 
are decisions in which groupthink could be a contamination factor and could lead to 
disastrous consequences for organizations. Currently, no survey instrument exists that can 
effectively gauge whether a group suffers from the groupthink phenomenon. Two surveys 
do exist, that have used questionnaires to assess the symptoms of groupthink, but each 
asked the subject to assess the group as a whole.  Esser (1998) finds fault in these survey 
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instruments, because the subject cannot know what the other group members believe and 
cannot observe another group member’s private behavior. 
Research Objectives 
 The objectives of this research are to: 
 
1. Determine the method needed to establish a valid and reliable instrument. 
 
2. Develop tools that will identify groupthink characteristics in a group. 
 
3. Measure the validity / reliability of the Groupthink tools used. 
 
4. Measure the reliability of the Groupthink Survey instrument. 
 
5. Develop recommendations to improve the process used in this study to 
identify groupthink characteristics.  
Limitations of this research 
1. The survey was administered to military units that conducted their Annual Training at 
Fort McCoy, WI, during training year 2001.  This was done to assure that the 
populations surveyed were of similar geographic, cultural and social backgrounds. 
2. Time and money available did not allow for any long term, in depth study of these 
organizations. 
Definitions 
Groupthink  A mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking 
becomes so dominant in a cohesive in-group that it tends to override realistic appraisal of 
alternative courses of action.  The term refers to deterioration in mental efficiency, reality 
testing, and moral judgments as a result of group pressures (Janis, 1971) 
 
TAM  The Training Assessment Model (TAM) is a management tool that provides unit 
leaders a framework for planning, supporting, and assessing training readiness.  It reflects 
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Lane Training  A process for training company-size (approximately 100 soldiers) and 
smaller units on collective tasks (prerequisite soldiers and leader individual tasks and 
battle drills) supporting a unit’s wartime mission (Training Circular 25-10). 
 
OC/T  An Observer Controller / Trainer (OC/T) is a soldier of equal rank or greater 
who facilitates a unit’s training by providing feed back on the training.  OC/T’s are able 
to perform tasks that are being trained and are knowledgeable on current U.S. Army 
doctrine (Field Manual 25-101). 
 
Branch  An arm or service of the U.S. Army (Field Manual 101-5-1) 
 
Collective Tasks  A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by units.  
Task are specific activities which contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing 
missions or other requirements.  Collective tasks make up collective training.  (Field 
Manual 25-101). 
 
Course of action (COA)  A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the 
accomplishment of a mission.  The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission 
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
 
Review of Groupthink Research 
Janis’s original analysis of four cases of policy decisions that resulted in fiascoes 
provided the raw material for Janis’s (1971) development of groupthink theory.  These 
cases included (1) the decision in 1941 by Admiral Kimmel and his advisors to focus on 
training rather than on the  defense of Pearl Harbor despite warnings of a possible 
surprise attack by the Japanese, (2) the decision in 1950 by President Truman and his 
advisors to escalate the Korean War by crossing the 38th parallel into North Korea, (3) the 
decision in 1960 by President Kennedy and his advisors to authorize the invasion of Cuba 
at the bay of Pigs, and (4) a series of decisions by President Johnson and his advisors to 
escalate the Viet Nam War during 1964-1967.  
Janis determined the identifying symptoms of groupthink and some of its 
antecedents and consequences by contrasting these cases with two historical cases, which 
produced good policy decisions.  The two cases used were the development of the 
Marshall Plan to avert economic collapse in post-war Europe and the handling of the 
Cuban missile crisis in 1962. 
Subsequently, Janis (1982) analyzed the series of decisions by President Nixon 
and his advisors to cover up the involvement of the Nixon White House in the burglary of 
the Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate building.  This case study was the 
first by Janis designed to test the generality of groupthink theory.  Therefore, he 
conducted this case analysis more systematically than the previous cases, assessing the 
antecedents of groupthink and the symptoms of a defective decision-making process, as 
well as the symptoms of groupthink.  Janis concluded that groupthink played a major role 
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in the Watergate cover-up. Indeed, he considered the Watergate cover-up to be his best 
example of groupthink.  From the Watergate case he inferred two antecedents of 
groupthink, which had not been included in his earlier (Janis, 1972) presentation of the 
theory.  The two additional antecedents that were added were – homogeneity of 
members’ ideology and high stress from external threats.  Janis’s groupthink model is 
summarized in Appendix A. 
In 1974 B.H. Raven also analyzed the Watergate cover-up and found good 
support for most of the antecedents and symptoms of groupthink.  However, his 
sociometric analysis of the Nixon case indicated that it was not a highly cohesive group, 
characterized by esprit de corps or mutual attraction.  Nevertheless, Raven viewed the 
Nixon group as cohesive in the sense that the members strongly desired to belong to the 
group and were bound to it by their loyalty to Nixon, the leader.  In his own analysis of 
the Watergate cover-up, Janis (1982) acknowledged Raven’s work, but challenged 
Raven’s determination that the group was not cohesive (did not possess esprit de corps).  
Janis argued that the primary decision-making group was composed of five persons – 
Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, and Colson – rather than 12 persons as Raven had 
suggested, and that during the period of time when crucial cover-up decisions were made, 
Dean had a positive relationship with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, rather than a negative 
relationship as Raven had indicated (Esser, 1998). 
Groupthink Studies 
The chief proposal of Janis’s (1982) framework is that when a group is 
moderately or highly cohesive, the presence of specific antecedent conditions (in addition 
to cohesiveness) increases the chances of the development of groupthink symptoms 
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(Janis, 1982).  Additionally, whenever a group displays most of the symptoms of 
groupthink, the group should exhibit specific, observable decision-making defects, which 
result in a low probability of a successful outcome, i.e., a low probability of unanticipated 
setbacks not occurring and obtaining the decision-maker’s objectives (Janis, 1982). 
Researchers from several disciplines have studied groupthink.  These studies used 
the distinct patterns of case analysis and empirical analysis to complete their research.  
Case analysis involves a retrospective application of decision fiascoes to the groupthink 
model.  Empirical analysis deals with laboratory tests of various aspects of Janis’s 
framework.  The results of these analyses were only partially consistent with Janis’s 
groupthink model (Neck & Moorhead, 1995). 
Considering the popularity of the concept, the scarcity of research examining its 
propositions is startling.  It appears that the efforts to explain why groupthink occurs and 
how to prevent it remain in the early stages.  As a result of this slow progress, our 
knowledge of groupthink and its useful applications remains somewhat limited. 
One explanation for this slow progress is that factors other than those specified in 
Janis’s model may be needed to complement his framework in order to explain the 
occurrence of defective decision making.  Past studies have veered away from the 
original groupthink model to suggest that additional factors are needed to explain why 
groupthink occurs within small groups.  Some of the variables that have been suggested 
to complement Janis’s original framework were group composition, group polarization, 
individual dominance, and group cognitions (Neck & Moorhead, 1995).  However, the 
presence of these factors does not necessarily help to explain why groupthink occurs 
because as Janis states: 
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 . . .groupthink is not simply a matter of fixed attributes of a group, nor is it a question of 
the types of personalities that happen to be dominant within the group.  If the same 
committee members show groupthink in making decisions at one time and not at another, 
the determining factors must lie in the circumstances of their deliberations, not in the 
fixed attributes of the individuals who make up the group.  The determining factors seem 
to be variables that can be changed and lead to more and productive norms . . (Janis, 
1982, p. 158) 
 
Case Analytic Studies 
Case analyses of groupthink primarily involve a retrospective application of 
Janis’s groupthink model to decision fiascoes in which the author(s) show how the 
fiascoes contained the major elements of groupthink framework – antecedent conditions, 
symptoms of groupthink, and decision-making defects.  The literature review by Neck 
and Moorhead (1995) revealed four such analyses: S. Smith’s 1984 analysis of the Iran 
Hostage Rescue Mission; T. R. Hensley’s and G. W. Griffin’s 1986 study of the Kent 
State Gym Controversy; and G. Moorhead’s, R. Ference’s, and C. P. Neck’s study in 
1991 of the Space Shuttle Disaster.  Additionally, one case study conducted in 1992, by 
C.P. Neck and Gregory Moorhead utilized the groupthink framework to analyze the jury 
deliberations in the trial of U.S. v. John Delorean – a situation in which groupthink did 
not occur in spite of the occurrence of groupthink antecedent conditions.  Table 2.1 
provides a summary of these groupthink case analyses (Esser, 1998). 
Table 2.1 — Case Studies of Groupthink 





Hostage rescue attempt 
in Iran 
Narrative description. All eight symptoms 
of groupthink were present. 
No consideration of antecedents 
or decision process defeats. 
   
Hensley & Griffin, 1986 
Kent State gymnasium 
controversy 
Narrative description.  All seven 
antecedents, seven groupthink symptoms 
(all except unanimity), and four symptoms 
of poor decision-making process were 
present 
Suggested three new symptoms 
of poor decision-making process: 
failure to maintain contact with 
opposition, lack of cooperation 
with mediators, and failure to 
extend deadlines. 
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  Table 2.1  Continued 




Moorhead, Ference, & 
Neck, 1991 
Challenger 
Three antecedents (cohesiveness, 
promotional leadership, insulation), all 
eight groupthink symptoms, and five 
symptoms of a poor decision process (all 
except incomplete survey of objectives 
and failure to consider risks) were present. 
Proposed that time and leadership 




   
Neck & Moorhead, 1992 
DeLorean trial 
Five antecedents (all except promotional 
leadership and methodical procedures) 
were present, but no groupthink 
symptoms or symptoms of a poor decision 
process were present. 
Concluded that groupthink was 
avoided.  Argued that the 
presence of methodical decision-
making procedures was the 
primary reason that groupthink 
was avoided. 
 
Although the case study approach yields a large amount of information and 
provides fascinating reading, the accuracy and applicability of these results in explaining 
the groupthink phenomenon can by questioned.  The possibilities of truly unique and 
non-representative groups, of researcher bias, and of inaccuracies in retrospective 
descriptions of group deliberations can reduce the robustness of case analysis conclusions 
(Neck & Moorhead, 1995).  Case analytic findings are useful for general anecdotal 
support but not as primary evidence of the occurrence of groupthink.  Consequently, the 
use of these decision fiasco case studies as primary evidence towards proving the 
occurrence of groupthink is debatable.    
Empirical Studies 
The empirical studies found in the groupthink literature utilized laboratory tests of 
various aspects of Janis’s framework.  Neck and Moorhead (1995) found that many 
researchers have attempted to empirically validate the occurrence of groupthink in a 
laboratory setting.  For example, in the earliest study of this type, M. L. Flowers in 1977 
explored the suggestion that leadership style (open vs. closed) and cohesiveness should 
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interact so that groupthink in the decision process is most likely to occur under conditions 
of high group cohesiveness and closed leadership.  She found that groups with an open 
leadership style produced significantly more suggested solutions and use of available 
facts than a closed leadership style, regardless of the cohesion level.   
Along the same lines, C. R. Leana tested in 1985 the effect of group cohesiveness 
and leader behavior on Janis’s symptoms of defective decision-making.  Her results, 
consistent with those of Flowers’s earlier study, suggested that groups with directive 
leaders proposed and discussed fewer alternative solutions to the problem than did groups 
with leaders who encouraged more member participation. 
Although the empirical groupthink studies seemed to provide at least some degree 
of support for the existence of groupthink, the utility of this support in terms of the 
occurrence of groupthink is questionable because of these studies’ errors of omission 
(Moorhead & Montanari, 1986).  These empirical studies also failed to test Janis’s entire 
theoretical framework; each of these studies only analyzed parts of the model.  No 
attempts were made to assess the entire framework – the antecedent conditions, the 
symptoms, the decision-making defects, and the decision outcomes. 
Moorhead and Montanari (1986), however, attempted to empirically investigate 
Janis’s groupthink model in a comprehensive manner.  The results provided limited 
support for the symptoms and defects postulated by Janis and for the causal sequence 
specified in the model.  Additionally, they found that the relationship between 
groupthink- induced decision defects and outcomes were not as strong as Janis stated.  
Due to their findings, the authors were prompted to suggest that many intervening and/or 
moderation factors not included in Janis’s framework might influence decision outcomes.  
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In other words, additional variables may need to be incorporated in Janis’s original 
framework to explain the occurrence of groupthink.  Table 2.2 provides a summary of 
these groupthink empirical studies (Esser, 1998). 
Table 2.2 — Empirical Studies of Groupthink 
    
Author, date 
 




Cohesiveness (C) (low/high) 
Leadership (L) 
(nondirective/directive) 
No. of proposed solutions 
No. of facts mentioned 
2 L main effects: more 
solutions and more facts 
with nondirective leadership 



















No. of facts mentioned 
No. of facts mentioned 
before and after the 
decision 
No. of solutions proposed 
No. of solutions discussed 
No. of discussions of risks 
No. of additional solutions 
proposed after the decision 
1C main effect: fewer 
facts were mentioned in 
non-cohesive groups 
4 L main effects: groups 
with directive leaders 
proposed and discussed 
fewer solutions and accepted 
the leader’s solution; 
however, members 
expressed less private 
agreement with the directive 
leader’s solution 




Path analysis with three antecedents (cohesiveness, 
insulation, leadership), four groupthink symptoms 
(invulnerability, morality, self-censorship, dissent), two 
decision process symptoms (alternatives, experts), and 
decision quality rating 
High C led to less self-
censorship, less dissent, and 
more alternatives discussed 
Insulation led to less 
invulnerability, more use of 
experts, fewer alternatives 
discussed, and poor quality 
decisions 
Promotional leadership led 
to feelings of morality, less 
dissent & more alternatives 
discussed 
 
In sum, although a moderate amount of groupthink research exists, little progress 
has really been made toward explaining why groupthink occurs in decision-making 
groups.  The enhanced groupthink model of Neck and Moorhead (1995) attempts to 
integrate the findings of the research to date and provide a better explanation of the 
conditions under which groupthink does or does not occur or can be prevented. 
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Overview of Groupthink 
Groupthink refers to a restrictive mode of thinking pursued by a group that 
emphasizes consensus rather than a careful analysis of options.  When dealing with 
complex and unstructured problems, this mode of thinking results in defective decision-
making behaviors that increase the risk of a poor group decision.  The fundamental 
problem underlying groupthink is the pressure to concede and conform.  Conformity in 
itself is not harmful.  However, when it subdues the meaningful discussion of the issues 
and opinions directly related to the task at hand, conformity could produce disastrous 
results.  When group members agree with one another to preserve a spirit of camaraderie 
or with blind faith in the others’ judgment, the resulting decision is likely to be a poor 
one.  This view was the basis of Janis’s (1982) groupthink proposition (Miranda, 1994). 
            Janis defined groupthink as “a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, 
and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures” (Janis 1982).  Groupthink has 
been also operationally defined by Moorhead and Montnari (1986) as a set of antecedent 
conditions leading to certain defective procedures that, in turn, are believed to promote 
poorer decisions.  These procedural conditions increase the probability of a faulty 
decision.   The following sections reflect this view of groupthink and address groupthink 
as four categories of variables: antecedent conditions, symptoms of groupthink, decision 
making defects, and decision outcomes.  Appendix A shows the Groupthink Model by 
Irving L. Janis. 
Antecedent conditions 
 
Janis posits that the occurrence of groupthink is dependent on situational and 
structural conditions surrounding the group.  The primary condition necessary for 
groupthink is high group cohesiveness.  Secondary conditions are the insulation of the 
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group from outsiders, the presence of a leader promoting his/her own preferred solution, 
the nature of the task requiring systematic analysis procedures, and group homogeneity 
(Moorhead & Montanari, 1989).   A summary of Janis and Mann’s (1977) five 
groupthink antecedents and their possible remedies are listed in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 — Summary of groupthink antecedents and their remedies 
   
Antecedent Conditions        Possible Remedies 
High cohesiveness  Task focus 
Group insulation  Use of external information 
Directive leadership  Equal participation and influence 
Group homogeneity  Group conflict 
Nature of task  Optimistic problem formulation 
 
1.  Group Cohesiveness.  Janis (1982) indicated that a high level of group 
cohesiveness would make the group more susceptible to pressures toward conformity and 
predispose the occurrence of groupthink.  Not all empirical research has supported this 
position, while others have only cautioned that extremely high levels of cohesiveness 
could be detrimental to group interactions (Miranda, 1994).  This relationship between 
level of cohesiveness and success in decision-making is borne out by research conducted 
by Callaway and Esser in 1984 (Miranda, 1994).    These researchers found that groups 
with intermediate levels of cohesiveness produced the highest quality decisions. 
 Moorhead and Montanari (1986) found that cohesiveness decreased self-
censorship, reduced conflict, and enhanced alternative generations and evaluation.  Thus 
the consequences of cohesiveness are not uniformly negative.  Keller, who in 1986 
reported that cohesive groups were more productive, reinforces this positive potential of 
cohesiveness (Miranda, 1994).   
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While influencing the level of group cohesiveness may not be desirable or even 
possible, facilitating productive meeting behaviors irrespective of the level of group 
cohesiveness is possible.  A critical consequence of cohesiveness appears to be reduced 
conflict as a result of the group members’ desire not to ”rock the boat.”  Separating ideas 
from the persons generating them will permit group members to evaluate the ideas 
successfully, while not interfering with the cohesiveness of the group.  This belief is 
supported by Bernthal and Insko who in 1993 found that groups with high social 
cohesiveness were more likely to experience groupthink than were groups high in task-
oriented cohesiveness (Miranda, 1994).  Thus, promoting a task focus during the meeting, 
rather that a focus on social behaviors alone can diffuse the danger of groupthink with 
highly cohesive groups. 
  2.  Group Insulation.  According to Janis (1982), groups whose members have 
weak ties and awareness of external groups are vulnerable to groupthink.  He indicated 
that insulated groups experienced a feeling of invulnerability and tended to consult less 
frequently with external experts.  McCauley’s research in 1989 empirically examined the 
effect of group insulation on groupthink.  He established that group insulation does 
predict the occurrence of groupthink (Miranda, 1994).  On the other hand, Moorhead and 
Montanari (1986) found that insulation decreased members’ perceptions of 
invulnerability and led them to refer more frequently to experts.  However, insulation 
also resulted in the production of fewer alternatives.  These results suggest that the effects 
of group insulation may be mediated by the group’s awareness of the problem and 
constructive actions to avail themselves of richer information and opinions.  Identifying 
deficiencies in the group’s knowledge and skills and seeking information or advice from 
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experts to supplement group knowledge can help counteract the effects of group 
insulation. 
3.  Directive Leadership.  Janis (1982) indicated that the group leader could play a 
strong role in inducing groupthink.  He suggested that a directive leadership style, where 
leaders actively advocate the adoption of their favored solution, is conducive to the 
development of groupthink. 
Empirical work indicates that the presence of a directive leader indeed increases 
the probability of groupthink and the risk of a poor decision (Miranda, 1994).  Promoting 
equal participation and influence during a group meeting can counteract the presence of a 
directive leader. 
4.  Group Homogeneity.  Groups composed of persons similar in backgrounds and 
ideologies are more prone to groupthink (Janis, 1982).  Such homogeneity leads to the 
production of fewer solutions and a narrow group focus while examining issues of 
concern and evaluating solutions. Empirical work appears to support the proposition that 
homogeneity of ideas and vision predisposes groupthink.  Tetlock performed a content 
analysis of statements made by leading national decision makers in 1979.  He concluded 
that decision makers who were susceptible to groupthink displayed less ideological 
complexity than did non-groupthink groups.  These groupthink groups also evaluated 
political groups with similar ideologies more favorably than did non-groupthink groups .  
Using conflict initiation strategies such as devil’s advocacy or dialectical inquiry to foster 
disagreement may help overcome the tendency to think alike engendered by similarity of 
members’ backgrounds (Miranda, 1994). 
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5.  Nature of the Task.  Groups involved in solving problems associated with a 
crisis situation are more likely to be victims of groupthink.  Further, judgmental or 
cognitive conflict tasks are far more prone to elicit groupthink (Janis 1982).  These tasks 
require decision makers to rely on their opinions and judgments in addition to the 
information provided.  This tendency often detracts attention from important information, 
as decision makers’ biases and perceptions emerge.  Further, decision makers involved 
with such tasks may ignore opinions other than their own.  This may spell disaster when 
the decision needs to be implemented and affects people with an opinion different from 
the decision maker’s.  When performing intellective tasks with a single correct solution, 
one must be as objective as possible.  Then differences in opinions and judgments will 
rarely be raised. 
The manner in which the problem is presented to the group by the leader or an 
influential group member sets the frame for the group’s perception of the problem.  When 
a group perceives that it is required to choose between a series of unfavorable options, it 
may invest more in the solution than it can afford to or than a rational solution would 
permit (Miranda, 1994).  Therefore, the phrasing of a problem as a lose-lose scenario, 
where the objective is to choose among unfavorable alternatives, results in riskier 
decisions.  Framing a problem in a more positive fashion is less likely to result in overly 
risky decisions (Miranda, 1994). 
Groupthink Symptoms 
Eight symptoms, outlined by Janis and Mann (1977), signal the working of the 
antecedents and the development of groupthink. They are divided into three main 
categories: (a) overestimation of the group’s power and morality; (b) closed mindedness; 
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and (c) pressures toward uniformity (Mohamed & Wiede, 1996).  These symptoms 
include both attitudes and behaviors that have a psychological and social function.  
Overestimation of the group’s abilities and position provides members with confidence 
that is necessary to dismiss fears and doubts about the group’s position.  Closed 
mindedness tends to reinforce whatever negative perspective the group may hold for the 
out-group or the environment.  Pressures toward uniformity guarantee that no group 
members will “rock the boat” by introducing ideas that challenge the group’s position.   
Collectively, these symptoms operate to maintain the “togetherness” feeling and 
combat the negative effects caused by low self-esteem and low self-efficacy.  When a 
policy-making group displays most or all of the symptoms in each of the three categories, 
the members perform their collective task ineffectively and are likely to fail to attain their 
collective objectives as a result of concurrence-seeking (Janis, 1982). This is to say that 
the symptoms of groupthink give rise to symptoms of defective decision making, which 
include (a) incomplete survey of objectives; (b) poor information search; and (c) selective 
bias in processing information that has been collected.  Janis and other researchers have 
repeatedly shown that the more these symptoms are present in any decision-making 
group, the higher the probability that the group will develop groupthink.  Therefore, it is 
more likely the group will arrive at a decision that will be unsuccessful, possibly even 
catastrophic (Groupthink – Leaders Guide, 1992). 
Symptom 1: Illusion of Invulnerability.  A feeling of power and authority is 
important to any decision-making group.  It gives group members confidence that they 
will be able to carry through on any decision reached.  However, if the group comes to 
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believe that they can do no wrong, and that every decision they reach will be successful, 
then the group has become prey to an illusion of invulnerability. 
Symptom 2: Belief in Inherent Morality of the Group.  All of us, whether a part of 
decision-making groups or not, need to believe in the rightness of our actions.  If groups 
have this symptom, there is never a question in their minds that the group is not doing the 
right thing.  In the extreme, this leads to exhortations that “God is on our side.”  This 
illusion relieves the group of the responsibility for justifying decisions according to 
rational procedures. 
Symptom 3: Collective Rationalization.  In finalizing any decision process, it is 
normal and natural to downplay the drawbacks of a chosen course.  The problem in a 
group arises when they see no fault to their plans, even if there is considerable evidence 
as to the folly of their chosen course of action.  Also, any legitimate objections that may 
exist are completely overshadowed by the perceived negative reaction that anyone 
voicing objection would receive. 
Symptom 4: Out-group Stereotypes.  Many of us have experienced this symptom 
as we were growing up.  We and our group of friends thought we were “cool” and made 
fun of the “not cool” cliques.  Basically, we formed stereotypes against individuals who 
were not part of the group.  As adults, this symptom continues where we stereotype our 
views on our enemy leaders as weak or incompetent.   
President Truman and his advisors fell victim to this temptation of falsely 
characterizing enemy groups in 1950 with the decision to cross the 38th parallel, a line 
drawn by the Chinese Communists as a “line in the sand” between North and South 
Korea.  The decision was made despite repeated warnings from Communist China that to 
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do so would be a declaration of war by the U.S. upon China.  The decision was based 
upon a false stereotype of the Chinese Communists as weak and dominated by Russia; 
obviously the stereotype proved false (Groupthink – leaders guide, 1992). 
Symptom 5: Self-Censorship.  Groupthink, in general, yields harmony amongst 
group members.  Therefore, with the symptom of self-censorship, we can assume that an 
individual group member does not want to disrupt harmony.  But, in reality, the fact is 
that the most common form of censorship is that which we commit upon ourselves under 
the guise of group loyalty, team spirit, or adherence to higher policy.  In theory, this 
symptom tends to lead members toward silence in their possible differences, therefore 
yielding to consistency. 
Symptom 6: Illusion of Unanimity.  Finally, all the rationalizations and 
psychological pressures have had their effect; the group now unites around a decision.  
Drawbacks are downplayed; the certainty of the final course is reinforced.  Doubting 
group members may even feel that they have adequately put their own fears to rest.  This 
symptom explains how individual opinions within groups are overshadowed by the 
group’s agreement to display a uniform opinion or standpoint. 
Symptom 7: Direct Pressure on Dissenters.  Group members are conditioned to 
keep rebel views to themselves.  Also, they are conditioned not to believe such rebellious 
views themselves, because to do so puts them at odds with the group.  The theory is that 
dissent or argument against the group’s presumed agreement is somehow counter to the 
group’s interests, even an act of disloyalty.  Group members may resort to sarcasm or 
ridicule of dissenting argument.  Often such ridicule will have as its basis an outlandish 
projection of what taking the opposition seriously could mean. 
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Symptom 8: Self-appointed Mind Guards.  A bodyguard is someone charged with 
the protection of another’s physical well-being.  In groupthink, a corollary entity may 
surface to protect us from disturbing thoughts and ideas, a mind guard.  Interestingly, 
such mind guards are typically self-appointed and perform their function not within the 
group itself, but rather far from the confines of group discussion.  Data, facts, and 
opinions which might bear directly upon the group are deliberately kept out of their 
purview.  Generally this is done with a variety of justifiable intentions, such as the time 
factor, believing it is not pertinent, and lastly, deeming that the group has already made 
up its mind. 
Groupthink Remodeled 
Additional Antecedent Conditions 
 
In addition to the situational and structural antecedent conditions defined by Janis, 
researchers have added procedural conditions that need to be added to the groupthink 
model.  These researchers on groupthink, Janis, Moorhead, Montanari, and Whyte, have 
identified several procedural conditions that preclude effective problem solving.  These 
procedural conditions include lack of methodical procedures, examination of few 
alternatives, discouragement of dissent, perception of invulnerability, and lack of expert 
advice.  These conditions, which increase the probability of the occurrence of groupthink, 
are discussed below (Miranda, 1994). 
1. Lack of Methodical Procedures 
A lack of methodical procedures makes choosing a solution without awareness of 
its implications or of competing alternatives easier for meeting participants.  Callaway 
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and Esser in 1984 report that when highly cohesive groups used inadequate decision 
procedures, they made poorer decisions (Miranda, 1994).    
2. Few Alternatives Examined 
The success of creative processes hinges on exploring many options.  An early 
limitation of alternatives to be discussed is symptomatic of defective decision-making 
that increases the chance of groupthink (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986).  Shyness, the 
presence of authority figures, or time constraints contribute to self-censorship during 
meetings.  Examination of a larger number of alternatives improves the probability of a 
successful decision. 
3. Discouragement of Dissent 
Courtwright in 1978 reported that the absence of disagreement was the strongest 
determinant of groupthink (Miranda, 1994).  A meeting environment that fosters the 
freedom to disagree among group members will, therefore, improve the probability of a 
good decision. 
4. Perceptions of Invulnerability 
Insulated groups that are unaware of opposing evidence and opinions are more 
likely to believe themselves invincible.  Callaway and Esser in 1984 report that groups 
that succumbed to groupthink were significantly more confident with their decisions than 
were other groups (Miranda, 1994).  When presented with evidence that contradicts their 
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5. Lack of Expert Advice 
Janis (1982) suggests that one or more experts external to the decision-making 
group be consulted and invited to challenge the group’s opinions during meetings.  
Advice from knowledgeable persons can counteract group insulation.  When access to 
such advice is restricted, the perception of invulnerability is compounded.  Providing 
groups with such access is an important step in combating groupthink. 
Antecedents Conditions Remolded 
Mark Schafer (1996) reports on a quantitative study on Janis’s original 
specifications of the groupthink model.  The study was built directly on the previous 
work done by Herek, Janis, and Huth in 1987.  The study reinvestigated the same 19 
cold-war crisis situations and used the same bibliographic sources identified by their 
outside experts as being reliable and of high quality.  In this research study, however, 
they investigated whether 10 different antecedent conditions –factors anticipated by Janis 
as causes of defective decision-making—were present in each case.  Their hypothesis, 
following the lead of Janis, is that certain antecedent conditions in the decision-making 
process (group structure, leadership style, and situational variables) result in the 
information-processing errors identified in 1997 by Herek, Janis, and Huth (Schafer, 
1996).  The ten antecedent conditions used in this quantitative study are shown in table 
2.4. 
Table 2.4 — Mark Schafer’s remolded ten antecedent conditions 
  
Group insulation Perceived short time constraint 
Lack of tradition of impartial leadership Low self-esteem 
Lack of tradition of methodical procedures High personal stress 
Group homogeneity Overestimation of the group 
Closed mindedness Pressures toward uniformity 
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The data from this study suggest that some of Janis’s antecedent conditions are 
less problematic for decision-making than originally suspected.  Situational factors –a 
short time constraint, high personal stress, and a recent failure –did not seem to factor 
into faulty decision-making.  Homogeneous groups did not produce more defective 
decision-making than did non-homogeneous groups.  Group insulation occured so rarely 
that they were unable to assess its contribution to faulty decision-making.  
The factors that did seem problematic for group decision-making fall into three 
areas: leadership style, traditional group procedures, and patterns of group behavior.  
These factors are clear and strong predictors not only of information-processing error but 
also of unfavorable outcomes.  Groups who wish to structure themselves to avoid faulty 
decision making are well advised to have impartial leadership and methodical procedures 
while they avoid overestimation of the group, closed mindedness, and pressures toward 
conformity.  
The results from the study are encouraging from a prescriptive point of view 
regarding decision-making.  Policies can be adopted by the leader and the decision-
making group specifically to address the faulty decision-making patterns that we identify, 
whereas the factors over which leaders and groups have no control, namely the situational 
variables, are not detrimental to the decision-making process. 
The conclusions from this study have important implications for Janis’s 
groupthink model.  Some of Janis’s original antecedent conditions now seem to be less of 
a concern.  The studies’ data suggest a more simplistic version of Janis’s model. Rather 
than being concerned with all three steps (antecedent conditions, information processing, 
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and outcomes), the data suggests that the key is to focus on the antecedent conditions – 
leadership style and pattern of group conduct (Schafer, 1996). 
Alternative Groupthink Model 
Christopher Neck and Gregory Moorhead (1995) reviewed the research on 
groupthink and analyzed the results and identified areas of inconsistency.  Based on these 
analyses and the integration of research on the effects of time pressure on group decision-
making, they revised the groupthink framework.  They altered the role of the leader, 
adjusted the linkages between groupthink antecedents and symptoms, and focused 
attention on the importance of time pressure and methodical decision-making procedures 
on the prevention of groupthink.  Their revised framework attempts to correct a 
fundamental flaw of Janis’s (1983) model – that is, to explain why within the same 
group, groupthinks can occur during one decision-making situation and not another. 
The model Neck and Moorhead (1995) revised, differs from Janis’s model in 
several ways.  They included additional antecedent conditions and modified the 
relationship between the antecedent conditions and groupthink symptoms.  They also 
inserted the moderating effect of methodical decision-making procedures and the addition 
of the moderator variable, closed leadership style.  Their enhancements were based on 
empirical research in both the groupthink and group processes literature, as well as 
Janis’s original case study analysis of decision fiascoes.  
Antecedent conditions Type A and B-1 (as shown in 3.1) are the same as 
described by Janis (1982).  The enhanced model developed by Neck and Moorhead 
includes two secondary antecedent conditions of the provocative situational context (B-2) 
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type.  These include (1) a highly consequential decision, and (2) pressure due to 
constraints of time. 
A highly consequential decision is defined as one in which the outcome of the 
decision greatly impacts the members of the group as well as other outside parties.  
Additionally, a highly consequential decision usually is associated with unexpectedness 
and a sense of urgency, which erodes the opportunity for a truly informed group decision.  
Neck and Moorhead included this element in their enhanced model because all the 
decision fiascoes that Janis studied as a basis for his theory were highly consequential 
decisions. 
Pressures due to time constraints are a perceptual condition in which members of 
the group feel they have a very limited amount of time in which to make a decision.  
Janis included this indirectly as a function of the antecedent condition, group cohesion.  
In the enhanced model, time constraint is included as a separate antecedent condition for 
several reasons.  First, Janis’s case study of the Vietnam policy-making decisions and G. 
Moorhead’s, R. Ference’s, and C. P. Neck’s 1991 case study of the space shuttle 
Challenger decision showed that groupthink was partially induced by time pressure.  
Second, research to date on the effects of time pressure on group decision making 
indicates this condition critically impacts the effectiveness / ineffectiveness of decisions 
made by small groups. 
Other studies cited by Neck and Moorhead (1995) also suggest that high time 
pressure leads to poor quality decisions by the group.  Since the final outcome of the 
groupthink framework is a low probability of successful (high quality) decision, this 
research seems to support time pressure as an additional antecedent condition. 
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Conclusion 
The review of the published groupthink research has revealed that the original 
framework proposed by Janis is an incomplete explanation of the occurrence of 
groupthink in small groups.  Neck and Moorhead (1995) proposed an alternative 
groupthink model to explain why groupthink could contaminate the same group at one 
time and not at another.  See Figure 2.0 for Neck and Moorhead’s alternative groupthink 
model.  In this paper we have expanded their model to include the procedural antecedent 
conditions as proposed by Miranda’s (1994) and Mark Schafer’s (1996) antecedent 
conditions remodeled.  As a result, an enhanced alternative groupthink model is proposed 
in Figure 2.1.     
The review of the published groupthink research has also revealed problems with 
past testing methodology – case studies and experimental studies.  To date, the theory has 
neither been proven nor supported by any past research methodology.  This leads to a 
dilemma of whether the theory is valid or is  being tested improperly, or is a little of both.  
Case studies start with the outcomes of poor decision-making and then move backwards 
toward the antecedents.  Case studies by their nature emphasize events (historical) and a 
sequence development.  Experimental studies, on the other hand, start by manipulation of 
the antecedents and then measure the outcomes.  For example, researchers would 
manipulate cohesion and then investigate whether the quality of the decision-making was 
affected.  The shortcoming of experimental studies on groupthink is that it focuses on the 
variables and often ignores the dynamics of the phenomenon.   
Case studies on groupthink have also dealt with the phenomenon as a process 
theory, whereas experimental studies have treated it as a variance theory.  Several signs 
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indicate that Janis (1982) intended to present a process and not a variance theory.  For 
example, the main theme of Janis’s work was to explain how groupthink developed.  
Also Janis never intended to relate a single variable to different levels of groupthink, as 
would be expected in a variance model.  Therefore, the methodology used in chapter 
three will be based on a process model of groupthink. 
Groupthink in the military 
 A military officer’s confidence and knowledge are increased with every school 
he/she attends, Officer Candidate School through Army War College.  Similarly every 
promotion and every assignment from platoon leader through division commander 
increases the professional competence and awareness of that competence.  Ultimately, as 
an officer climbs the promotion ladder and is selected above his/her peers for a major 
command, he/she will be treated with a higher degree of respect and courtesy.  Such a 
process would give any mortal considerable faith in his/her judgment (Cantrell, 2000). 
 No officer commands alone, but surrounds him/her with staff officers who think 
as he/she does.  If these staff officers don’t agree with the commanding officer, they can 
be quickly brought in line with the threat of a negative evaluation report.  Therefore, the 
staff endeavors to please the commander, feeds him/her information that supports his/her 
position.  Subordinates expect him/her to dictate policy and be brilliant, so the 
commander dictates policy and usually is brilliant.  However, sometimes the commander, 
like the best humans, will act emotionally or without all the key facts.  This can be 
especially true when units are in combat or training scenarios that simulate combat 
conditions (stress).  The staff / subordinates, who are also under stressful conditions, will 
duly execute the commander’s wishes.  They will produce estimates, briefing charts, and 
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operations orders in support of those wishes.  Some subordinates, perhaps with the 
benefit of fewer preconceived notions or perhaps having facts unknown to the 
commander, might see folly in his/her plan.  However, the commander may be too senior 
and intimidating or the subordinates may be too junior or too cautious to approach 
him/her. 
 The commander might find it difficult to admit, even to him/her, that he is wrong.  
Although the commander would be solely responsible, in such a case, he/her would not 
have fouled up alone.  Really big blunders often take teamwork.   In this case, the 
commander’s misstep went uncorrected because of staff groupthink.  This is where 
subordinates are too timid to speak up, an executive officer unwilling to trouble the boss 
with dissent, and an institution, has failed to prepare them all for this situation. 
 Since we can never completely eliminate misjudgments, we should create an 
environment where subordinates are more likely to identify and draw the commander’s 
attention to those misjudgments.  This will require effort by all three parties to the 
problem – subordinates, seniors, and the institution that trained them.  To assist the above 
parties to avoid groupthink, we endeavor in this thesis to develop a model with 
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Figure 2.1 Enhanced Alternative groupthink Model
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Chapter 3:  Methodology of Procedures 
 
Current assessments and critiques 
 
To date only two studies have used questionnaires to assess the full set of the 
eight symptoms of groupthink (Esser, 1998).  The first such study was by Moorhead and 
Montanari (1986), which assessed the full set of eight symptoms of groupthink using a 
24-items questionnaire, which they had developed earlier.  The questionnaire is 
composed of three items for each symptom, except the illusion of invulnerability (four 
items) and collective rationalization (two items).   
In a second, more recent study done by Richardson in 1994, all eight symptoms of 
groupthink were assessed using the Groupthink Index (Esser, 1998).  The Groupthink 
Index is a commercially available questionnaire designed for use in management training 
(Glaser, 1993).  The Groupthink Index is a 40-item questionnaire composed of five items 
for each of the eight groupthink symptoms.  The Groupthink Index yields a total 
groupthink score and subscale scores for each of the eight-groupthink symptoms.  
Esser’s (1998) critique of these two studies indicates that the eight symptoms of 
groupthink proposed by Janis (1972) are difficult to assess using the available 
questionnaires.  Esser states that  the symptoms may not be conceptually distinct.  It is 
also possible that the questionnaires, themselves, are to blame.  All questions on the 
Groupthink Index ask the subject to assess the members of the group, while the 
Moorhead and Montanari questionnaire includes some questions about the subject, some 
questions about one or more members of the group, and some questions about the group 
as a whole. 
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According to Esser (1998), when the questions ask the subject to assess the other 
members of the group, the subject is put in a position similar to that of an outside 
observer.  The subject still cannot know what the other group members believe, for 
example, questions on invulnerability or morality.  Also the subject cannot observe 
another group member’s private behavior, for example, self-censorship.   
Therefore, in building our assessment survey on groupthink symptoms, we 
created questions that would focus on the behaviors or attitudes of the subject.  The 
assessment of whether the group exhibits groupthink symptoms should be based on the 
sum of these self-assessments by the individual group members. 
Process Theory 
The nature of the groupthink model directly affects how it should be tested 
(Mohamed & Wiebe, 1996).  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, groupthink is best 
tested as a process theory, not a variance theory.  Process models tell a story of how a 
specific phenomenon occurs.  The focus is on the necessary events that lead to the 
development of the phenomenon.  Because process models tell a story of how the 
phenomenon develops, the temporal order of the events is important.  For example, 
process models are similar to movies that tell a story, not just single snapshots. 
It is crucial that the new research findings, outlined in chapter two, be 
incorporated into the process model used for this paper.  The process model methodology 
was based on Christopher Neck’s and Gregory Moorhead’s (1995) alternative groupthink 
model.  The main aspects that will be tested from their model are the moderating effects 
of methodical decision-making procedures and variables of leadership style (open or 
closed).  The procedural antecedent conditions as outlined by Miranda (1994) have been 
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added into Neck’s and Moorhead’s alternative groupthink model.  Mark Schafer’s (1996) 
antecedent conditions remolded have also been reconfirmed as being incorporated into 
their model.  This will insure that the model’s antecedent conditions are tested in the 
framework of procedural, situational, and structural aspects.  Therefore, the model used 
in this research will be an enhanced alternative groupthink model, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Neck and Moorhead (1995) developed three propositions that could be tested 
using their alternative groupthink model.  These propositions were revised for this thesis.  
The enhanced alternative groupthink model will use these three propositions to provide a 
framework when determining if groupthink characteristics exist.  The three propositions 
used are as follows: 
Proposition 1:  Groups that evidence a low degree of antecedent conditions will not 
exhibit groupthink symptoms in the presence of a closed style leader and /or when the 
group does not establish methodical decision-making procedures.   
Proposition 2:  Groups that evidence a high degree of antecedent conditions will exhibit 
groupthink symptoms in the presence of a leader portraying closed leader style behaviors 
and / or when the group does not use established methodical decision-making procedures.  
Proposition 3:  Groups that evidence a high degree of antecedent conditions will not 
exhibit groupthink symptoms in the presence of an open style leader and /or when the 
group establishes methodical decision-making procedures.   
Propositions one through three will serve to test the moderating impact of 
leadership behaviors and methodical decision-making procedures between antecedent 
conditions and groupthink symptoms.   
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To test the enhanced alternative groupthink model, a series of four survey 
instruments (tools) was designed for this study  to determine if groupthink characteristics 
are present in a military unit.  Figure 3.2 outlines the four process model survey 
instruments used during this research.  The first survey determined which, if any, of the 
antecedent’s conditions were present in the unit and to what degree.  The core decision-
making group members completed this survey within the first four days of their Annual 
Training.  Members of this group were from the company chain of command and 
included the following personnel: Company Commander, First Sergeant, all platoon 
leaders, all platoon sergeants, and any attached element senior leaders. 
Figure 3.2 Process Model Survey Instruments 
Survey 1               Survey 2                 Survey 3                  Survey 4 











a. Symptoms of 
    Groupthink 
b. Leader Style 
Method 






The second survey, completed by the Observer Controller / Trainer (OC/T), 
checked the unit’s use of the U.S. Army’s decision-making process, called “Estimate of 
the Situation” (FM 7-10, 1990).  The estimate is a continuous process that leaders are 
taught in U.S. Army schools to use for every tactical decision (FM 7-10, 1990).  
Therefore, the intent of this survey was to check the moderating variable of methodical 
decision-making procedures.  The survey had several questions crafted to each of the five 
steps of the estimate process.   The OC/T was chosen to do this survey because it is their 
responsibility to observe the unit’s actions as they conduct training and then coach them 
on any doctrinal aspects that needs work.   
 
Groupthink     page  37 
The third survey had two components: symptoms of groupthink and leadership 
style behaviors (open versus closed).  The core decision-making group took the 
symptoms of the groupthink portion of the survey during the end of the second week of 
the unit’s Annual Training.  This allowed enough time for the group to undergo several 
decision-making events.  The intent of the survey was to determine which, if any, of the 
symptoms of groupthink were present in the group.  The OC/T and the core decision-
making group took the leader style portion of the survey also during the end of the second 
week.  The intent of the survey was to determine if the leadership style behavior was 
open or closed. 
The fourth survey in the process determined if the group displayed any of the 
consequences of suffering from groupthink symptoms.  Janis (1971) explains that when a 
group displays most or all of the groupthink symptoms, a detailed study of their 
deliberations is likely to reveal a number of immediate consequences.  These 
consequences are, in-effect, products of poor decision-making practices because they lead 
to inadequate solutions to the problem under discussion.  Several questions were crafted 
for each of the seven variables of defective decision-making.  This survey was completed 
by the units assigned OC/T near the end of the second week of Annual Training.  The 
OC/T, through his observations, would be able to observe these variables of defective 
decision-making if they occurred. 
Selection of Subjects 
Company size military units were chosen as the appropriate level of command to 
conduct this research for several reasons.  First, U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard 
units at company and below are established cohesive units.   These units often conduct 
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realistic collective training at platoon and company level, which builds a very cohesive 
group.  Second, in the National Guard and Army Reserves, this collective training is 
planned, prepared, and executed at platoon and company level.  An established core 
decision group (chain of command) makes decisions throughout the training events.   
Third, the core decision-making participants at company level through the appropriate 
level of military education would have received training on the “Estimate of the 
Situation” process.  This process is taught at all senior non-commissioned officer schools 
and all officer basic courses, thus they should be using a standard decision-making 
procedure, which would be designed to eliminate groupthink.  The “Estimate of the 
Situation” process is a single, established, and proven analytical process.  The “Estimate 
of the Situation” is an adaptation of the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving 
(FM 101-5, 1997) 
Four company size units were selected for this research.  To ensure an even 
testing of Army units, each of the four units was selected from a different branch.  The 
units came from the following branches:  artillery, engineer, infantry, and chemical. 
Field Procedures / Data Collection 
A unit’s Annual Training normally lasts two weeks with about ten days spent in 
the field conducting collective tactical training.  But before a unit arrives at Annual 
Training, they would have drilled two days a month for a year.  During these drill periods 
the antecedents of groupthink may have materialized.  Therefore, the first survey that 
checks for the presence of antecedents was completed by the core decision-making group 
during the first few days of Annual Training. 
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The second survey determined if the unit was using the U.S. Army’s methodical 
decision-making procedures or some variation.  This survey was completed by the unit’s 
assigned OC/T during the second week of Annual Training.  By then the unit would have 
completed a large portion of their collective training in the field environment.  The OC/T 
during this time would have observed several tactical scenarios, which caused the unit’s 
decision-making group to make some decisions. 
The third survey attempts to determine which symptoms of groupthink were 
present and the leadership style behaviors (open vs. closed) that were present.  The core 
decision-making group completed this survey during the latter half of the second week.  
The tactical scenarios were the means that would have exposed the group to these 
variables. 
The fourth survey concluded whether as a result of the group decisions, there 
were any symptoms of defective decision-making.  The OC/T would complete this 
survey at the end of the two-week Annual Training, thereby allowing all of the unit’s 
decisions to come to resolution.  
Content Validity 
Content validity, usually judgmental, refers to the extent that the survey 
instrument provides adequate coverage of the topic under study.  This type of validity 
was approached in two ways.  First, a review of the literature was done to evaluate the 
research on groupthink, analyze the results, and identify areas of inconsistency.  Based on 
these analyses and integration of research on the effects, an enhanced alternative 
groupthink model was developed.  Second, the survey was given to an expert, Dr. Sheryl 
J. Johnson, who assessed the content of the survey instrument, in terms of whether it 
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accurately identified characteristics of groupthink.  Adjustments were made and the 
changes were reviewed with this professional to make sure the changes were accurate.  
Third, the surveys were pre-tested with military personnel who were of equal rank as the 
individuals who would be tested.  This assessed whether the research subjects clearly 
understood the questions as they were crafted. 
Survey Instruments 
Surveys one through four were comprised of various numbers of questions with 
several statements focused on a specific variable of groupthink.  Each of the four surveys 
gave the respondents five options for rating each statement, ranging from five — 
meaning this is always true of our organization, to one — never true of our organization.  
The scale is listed in table 3.3.  Surveys one and three, which were given to the group, 
had four questions which requested demographic information, including rank, gender, 
time in current position, and attendance at appropriate school for position currently held.  
A sample of each of the four surveys is found in Appendix A thru D. 
Table 3.1 Scale used on the survey instruments for responses 
5 – Always True 
4 
3 – Sometimes True 
2 
1 – Not True 
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
The process theory during this research used four different surveys to gather data.  
Each survey gathered data on a different aspect of the groupthink syndrome.  During 
analysis a score of 70% or better was used to determine whether specific variables or 
 
Groupthink     page  41 
conditions of groupthink existed.  This is the U.S. Army’s standard used when 
administering tests. 
Survey one, completed by the unit’s core decision-making group, determined 
which of the antecedents of groupthink were present.  The antecedents found by the 
survey were listed for that particular unit.  In Esser’s (1998) review of groupthink 
research, he provides evidence on Janis’s original cases that were characterized as having 
groupthink and as having four antecedents each.  Therefore, in this study, identifying four 
or more of the seventeen conditions would evidence a high degree of antecedent 
conditions. 
Survey two, completed by the OC/T, determined if the unit was using a 
methodical decision making procedure.  The OC/T’s responses to the survey were 
averaged out.  The unit received a “yes” for using methodical decision-making 
procedures if a 70% or better score was received. 
Survey three was broken down into two parts.  Part I, completed by one the unit’s 
core decision-making group, determined if the unit exhibited the symptoms of 
groupthink.  Part II, completed by both the OC/T and the unit’s core decision-making 
group, and determined whether the unit exhibited a closed leadership style.  The scores of 
all the surveys were averaged out.  The unit receiving a score of 70% or better on Part I, 
determined whether the unit was suffering from the symptoms of groupthink.  The unit 
receiving a score of 70% or better on Part II determined the type of leadership style 
behaviors (open or closed).  
Survey four, completed by the OC/T, determined if the unit exhibited any of the 
symptoms of defective decision-making.  The OC/T’s responses to the survey were 
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averaged out.  The unit received a “yes” for this condition if the score was 30% or above.  
The standard for the scoring was changed from 70% to 30 % for survey four, because we 
wanted our groups to arrive at the right solution to their decisions (70% of the time), 
instead of only 30% of the time. 
After processing all of the survey data, receiving back briefs from the unit’s 
assigned OC/T, and completing the analysis using the four propositions, it was 
determined whether groupthink was present or not present in the unit.  A flow chart 
depicting how the surveys were integrated and processed is in Figure 3.3. 
Methodical Assumptions 
The research assumes the following: 
1. That people answered the survey honestly. 
 
2. That the respondents were able to read and understand the statements on the survey. 
 
3. That the chain of command did not place undue stress or consequences associated 
with the survey. 
 
4. That the OC/T, who is evaluating the unit, did not preempt any of the survey 
questions. 
 
5. That the respondent either had the appropriate level of military schooling or training 
to understand the Army’s decision-making process. 
 
Limitations of Methodology or Procedures 
1. The OC/T may be called upon to coach / teach the unit on the U.S. Army’s “Estimate 
of the Situation” decision-making process.  This may cloud his perception on how 
well the unit is using the process, as the OC/T becomes less objective in his 
observations. 
 
2. The assigned OC/T was different for each unit, so surveys two and four will be based 
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Chapter 4:  Findings and Analysis of Results 
 
This chapter contains the process model results of three of the four surveys 
conducted for this research.  The results are shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.  An 
interpretation of the results follows the factual information. 
The OC/T assigned to the fourth unit decided against having the unit participate in 
the testing.  Early observations by the OC/T led him to determine that there were severe 
leadership problems in the unit.  The OC/T believed that subjecting the soldiers of the 
unit to surveys that asked leadership and group dynamics questions would hamper his 
overall effort in addressing these issues with the unit. 
Figure 4.1.  Process Model Results on Unit A-1 
Not present
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Unit A-1 Results and Interpretations 
  Unit A-1 had a low presence of antecedents, with the following ones found:  
cohesive group, homogeneous group, highly consequential decision.  The OC/T found 
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that they were not using methodical decision-making procedures, as they scored only 
53% on survey two.  The unit clearly had an open leader style, as they scored 100% on 
survey three.  The unit scored very low (13%) on survey three, indicating groupthink 
symptoms not present, but scored very high (86%) on survey four, indicating defective 
decision-making symptoms were present.  Surveys three and four results don’t correlate 
as one shows no groupthink characteristics present, but the other reflects that defective 
decision-making symptoms were present.   In reviewing Unit A-1’s process model and 
receiving an out brief from their OC/T, it was determined that the unit suffers from 
groupthink characteristics. 
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OC/T found that they were not using methodical decision-making procedures, as they 
scored only 51% on survey two.  The unit has an open leader style, as they scored 80% 
on survey three.  The unit scored very low (13%) on survey three indicating groupthink 
symptoms not present, but scored (64%) on survey four, reflecting that they suffer from 
symptoms of defective decision-making.  Again surveys three and four results don’t 
correlate as one shows no groupthink characteristics present, but the other reflects that 
defective decision-making symptoms were present.  In reviewing Unit A-2’s process 
model and receiving an out brief from their OC/T, it was determined that the unit suffers 
from groupthink characteristics.  
Figure 4.3.  Process Model Results on Unit A-3 
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Unit A-3 Results and Interpretations 
 Unit A-3 had a high presence of antecedents, with the following ones found: 
cohesive group, lack of methodical decisions-making process, and homogeneity of group 
members, highly consequential decision.  The OC/T found that they were not using 
methodical decision-making procedures, as they scored only 64% on survey two.  The 
unit clearly had an open leader style, as they scored 80% on survey three.  The unit 
scored very low (25%) on groupthink symptoms, but scored very high (10 of 14 
questions indicating presence) on defective decision-making symptoms.  Again surveys 
three and four results don’t correlate as one shows no groupthink characteristics present, 
but the other reflects that defective decision-making symptoms were present.   In 
reviewing unit A-3’s process model and receiving an out-brief from their OC/T, it was 
determined that the unit suffers from groupthink characteristics.  
Comparison of Units A1 & A2 Against A3 
 In Units A1 and A2, low antecedents were found to be present as compared to  
A3 where antecedents were found to be high.  Overall this was the major difference 
between all units.  The evidence found in Unit A1 and A2 does not support Proposition 
#1.  Even with low antecedents and an open leader style in each unit, they were found to 
have characteristics of groupthink.  This seems to be mainly due to not using methodical 
decision-making procedures.  Even when there is an open leader style, the unit can not 
over come faulty decision making procedures.  The evidence would also suggest that 
methodical decision-making procedures carry more weight than an open leader style. 
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Comparison of Units A1, A2, and A3 
All three units surveyed with the enhanced alterative groupthink model reflected 
that groupthink characteristics were present in all of the units.  All units did have 
indicators that if considered alone, could have led to different conclusions as to whether 
groupthink was present or not.  But, when considering the whole process of surveys and 
receiving an out-brief from the unit’s OC/T, a different conclusion was determined.   
Proposition two was determined to be true by the results found in unit A-3’s 
surveys.  Two units (A1 and A2) had low evidence of antecedent conditions, had an open 
leader style, suffered from not using a methodical decision making system, but did have 
groupthink characteristics present.  These results run against proposition one, and may 
indicate that methodical decision-making procedures are more important than an open 
leader style.    
All units’ scores on the decision-making survey indicated that they were not using 
methodical procedures.  Unit A3 even indicated one of their antecedents as being a “lack 
of methodical decision-making process.”  All of the above data indicates that National 
Guard and Reserve units generally have problems with applying the Army’s methodical 
decision-making process.   
National Guard and Reserve units have problems with the decision-making 
process for several reasons.  First, units only have 39 days a year to train, and these days 
fill up quickly with administrative tasks.  This leaves little time for units to learn / 
practice / utilize the Army's decision-making process.  Secondly, military education 
systems for the National Guard and Reserves are correspondence (paper based) programs.  
On the other hand, their active duty counterparts attend residence programs, where they 
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receive a hands-on application to the decision-making process.  To close the educational 
gap between the two systems, the Army is moving to more of the following training: web 
based, CD-ROM based, and video streaming type training.  
All three units had the same basic trends: presents of the “cohesive group” 
antecedent condition; groups did not see themselves as having groupthink symptoms; 
groups felt their leader used an open style of leadership.  In contrast, all OC/T found the 
consequences of groups that suffer from groupthink symptoms to be present and found 
that none of the groups used a methodical decision making procedure.  The evidence 
suggests that groups that are very cohesive can not objectively assess themselves in terms 
of the groupthink phenomena.  
Comparison of Low Groupthink Symptoms against High Defective Decision-Making 
Symptoms 
 
 All unit surveys indicate that the eight symptoms of groupthink proposed by Janis 
(1972) are difficult to assess using questionnaires.  Especially noted in Unit A3 when 
antecedents were high, unit lacked using a methodical decision-making process, and 
scored high on defective decision-making symptoms; therefore, groupthink symptoms 
scores should have been high, but instead were low.  This evidence supports Esser’s 
(1998) review of groupthink research, where he also found that symptoms of groupthink 
were difficult to assess.  Esser’s (1998) review found fault in Glaser’s (1993) Groupthink 
Index questionnaire as the questions asked the subject to assess the members of the 
group.  Esser (1998) continues to find fault in Moorhead and Montanari’s (1996) 
questionnaire because it, too, asked questions about the group as a whole.  The survey 
questions developed for our study tried to correct this fault by focusing the questions on 
behaviors and attitudes of the subject.   
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 Since all three groups evidence a high degree of defective decision-making 
consequences, but a low degree of groupthink symptoms, indications seem to point that 
another problem is at work.  It may be that when groups are so trapped within the 
symptoms of groupthink, that they are unable to assess themselves properly.  The 
measurement of groupthink symptoms by outside observers may not be the obvious 
solution either.  As research conducted by W. Parks in 1990 pointed out, the symptoms of 
groupthink cannot by assessed easily by outside observers (Esser, 1998). 
 So are we left with no real appropriate way to measure groupthink symptoms, by 
either a subject questionnaire or outside observer?  The evidence supports the reason why 
we developed a process model to determine if groupthink characteristics were present in 
the unit.  The model needs additional refinement in the type of measurement technique 
used, such as using a subject interview technique on surveys one and three. 
Analysis of Results 
 
 Individual surveys of groupthink symptoms, antecedents, or defective decision-
making could lead to different conclusions as to whether the characteristics were present 
or not.  The process of surveying all aspects of groupthink and out briefing external 
observers proved to be very valuable in making a determination.  Our model provides an 
in-depth look at all aspects of groupthink and allows determination to be made then.   
 The combined results of all surveys, as shown in figure 4.4 reflect that there is a 
conflict between the groups’ survey results concerning groupthink symptoms and the 
OC/T determining that the consequences of defective decision-making symptoms were 
present.  The results support Esser’s (1998) research review where he noted that the 
groupthink symptoms were difficult to assess using subject questionnaires.  To really 
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assess the symptoms of groupthink, a combination of research techniques may need to be 
employed, such as external observations, interviews with subjects, and subject 
questionnaires.  
 The results also indicate that not using methodical decision-making procedures 
had more effect on the overall process than having an open leader style.  An open leader 
style is an important goal for decision-making, but leaders may allow it to go too far over 
the concern of maintaining a “cohesive group.”  This would have a negative effect on 
decision-making, thereby increasing the importance of using a standard set of procedures 
for decision-making.  Then when combined with an open leader style, groups would have 
the best decision-making scenario possible.  
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Chapter 5:  Summary and Recommendations 
 
Summary of the Project 
In 1989, Gregory Moorhead and John R. Montanari developed a groupthink 
assessment inventory to conduct an empirical investigation of the groupthink framework.  
Later, Organization Design and Development Incorporated (1993) also developed a 
groupthink inventory.  These two inventories along with Christopher P. Neck’s and Greg 
Moorhead’s alternative groupthink model formed the basis for this research. 
The purpose of this paper was to develop a reliable assessment process for 
determining if groupthink characteristics were present in a military unit.  Christopher 
Neck’s and Gregory Moorhead’s alternative groupthink theory was updated with recent 
research, creating an enhanced alternative groupthink model.  To test this new groupthink 
model, a process theory consisting of four surveys was developed. 
In June of 2001, three company size reserve military units completed the process 
model’s surveys.  The military units were of the following types of branches:  artillery, 
engineer, and chemical.  The survey results were complied, then analyzed within the 
framework of the process model.  Each unit’s process model was compared to the other 
models to determine correlations. 
OC/T’s were interviewed after the results of their unit’s surveys were compiled.  
They were asked how the process theory’s findings compared to their assessment of the 
unit, as to whether groupthink characteristics were present in the unit.  Each time, the 
OC/T’s survey results did not correlate with the survey results the unit members 
completed. 
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Conclusions 
Group problem solving is a complex and challenging phenomenon.  
Comprehensive models are needed to guide researchers in dealing with this phenomenon.  
Irving Janis’ groupthink model has served a valuable role in generating interest in group 
problem-solving processes.  However, the model has not incorporated three decades of 
theory and research, has received limited empirical support, and is restrictive in scope.  
Recent theory and research, as well as critical evaluation of the model, have suggested 
the need for an expanded, integrative groupthink model. 
Building in part on Janis’ original groupthink model, this thesis offers the 
enhanced alternative groupthink model as such a framework.  By incorporating prior 
theory and research, this new model is intended for a broad range of problem situations.  
The enhanced alternative groupthink model relaxes restrictive assumptions of groupthink 
and recasts certain groupthink variables.  Furthermore, this model explicitly recognizes 
the roles that leadership and decision-making procedures can play in group problem 
solving. 
This thesis presents the enhanced alternative groupthink model as a foundation for 
further testing and refinement.  Researchers should recognize the complex, dynamic 
nature of group problem solving, but use a broad range of methodologies when 
conducting research.  As such, the enhanced alternative groupthink model has been 
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Recommendations 
The enhanced alternative groupthink model should serve as a catalyst for the 
modification of future empirical groupthink research.  This would ensure comprehensive 
coverage of the model, as opposed to testing only parts of the framework. 
The focus of future research could be to examine the differentiating features of 
the enhanced model.  The moderating effects of a closed leadership style behavior on the 
relation between groupthink antecedent conditions and symptoms could be examined.  
Additionally, the focus of future research should encompass the moderating impact of 
using a methodical decision-making procedure between antecedents and symptoms of 
groupthink.  
If the enhanced alternative groupthink model is supported by empirical work, it 
will be the catalyst towards developing better prescriptions for training managers and 
group members to avoid groupthink in decision-making situations.  Prescriptions could 
be in the form of : (1) suggestions for when a leader might alter his/her leadership 
behaviors which may depend on the nature of the group and the presence or absence of 
the antecedent conditions, and (2) establishment of methodical decision-making 
procedures such as the Army “Estimate of the situation.” 
In summary, the enhanced alternative groupthink model is only the initial step of 
progress toward shaping our understanding of groupthink into a useful tool for building 
successful decision-making groups.  This model is the first step toward increasing 
groupthink’s applicability to “real world” decision-making groups.   Subsequent steps 
should be empirical tests of this model, followed by additional theory development.  The 
   
Groupthink     page  55  
final improvement for this area of study should be training programs for leaders and 
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Appendix A - Antecedent Survey (Decision Making – Unit Survey #1) 
 
DIRECTIONS:   
♦ Read and understand the following consent statement.   
I understand that by returning this questionnaire, I am giving my informed consent as a 
participating volunteer in this study.  I understand the basic nature of the study and agree that any 
potential risks are exceedingly small.  I also understand the potential benefits that might be 
realized from the successful completion of this study.  I am aware that the information is being 
sought in a specific manner so that no identifiers are needed and so that confidentiality is 
guaranteed.  I realize that I have the right to refuse to participate and that my right to withdraw 





Read each of the items carefully.  Decide to what 
extent you believe each statement is true of your 
organization today. 
Rate each statement on a scale of 1-5. 
Circle the number that best describes your organization 
as it exists today. 
 
 
Not          Sometimes         Always 
True             True                 True 
 1         2         3          4            5 
In your opinion  
1. I feel there is a sense of trust among the members of 
our group. 
 
2. Our group never considers seeking advice from experts 
on solving problems. 
 
3. The leader of the group encourages everyone to discuss 
and examine all possible solutions to the problem. 
 
4. The only time our unit uses the decision making process 
is during Annual Training. 
 
5. Members of our group generally think alike. 
 
6. I feel pressure from outside sources (chain of command, 
OC/T) on my group during decision-making. 
 
7. I consider myself a valuable member of this group. 
 
8. Outcomes from our decisions always impact outside 
parties. 
 
9. Decisions associated with a crisis situation (time 
pressured event) are made by the leader without any 
input from the group. 
 
10.   We could have developed a better solution than the  
chosen course of action. 
 
11. My opinion in group discussion is not taken seriously. 
 
12. I never take reasonable risks. 
 
13. When expert advice was available, my team ignored it 
when it went against our preferred solution. 
 
1. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
2. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 




4. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
5. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
6. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
7. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
8. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 




10. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
11. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
12. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
13. 1       2        3          4            5 
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14. I feel people on our team are friendly toward each other.
 
15. Members are discouraged from seeking help from 
persons outside the group. 
 
16. Our leader seeks out everyone’s ideas, especially from 
the silent members 
 
17. Our decision-making procedures are very orderly and 
systematic. 
 
18. Everyone in our group shares the same beliefs / ideas. 
 
19. During decision-making my group never feels pressure 
from outside threats (chain of command, OC/T) 
 
20. When a decision made by the group goes badly, 
everyone’s self-worth is lowered. 
 
21. Members of our group are never impacted by the 
outcomes of our decisions. 
 
22. We never have enough time to make a decision. 
 
23. During decision-making we consider very few 
alternatives. 
 
24. Dissenting arguments are encouraged as the group 
discusses an issue. 
 
25. I tend to explain away potential problems created by the 
group’s decision. 
 
26. Professional development classes are conducted by 
someone within the unit. 
 
27. I think there is a great sense of belonging within our 
group. 
 
28. When deficiencies in the group’s knowledge and skills 
are discovered, we seek advice from outside experts. 
 
29. The leader of our group encourages everyone to 
express his/her opinions in group discussion. 
 
30. When making tactical decisions, we follow the same 
general procedures each time. 
 
31. Very diverse individuals make-up our group. 
 
32. I always feel that our group is competing against other 
groups. 
 
33. My self-confidence decreases when poor decisions are 
made by our group. 
 
14. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
15. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
16. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
17. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
18. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
19. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
20. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
21. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
22. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
23. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
24. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
25. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
26. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
27. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
28. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
29. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
30. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
31. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
32. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
33. 1       2        3          4            5 
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34. Tough decisions cause us to choose between a series 
of unfavorable options. 
 
35. We never feel pressure due to time constraints. 
 
36. We survey as many alternatives as possible in solving a 
problem. 
 
37. I avoid bringing up an issue or argument that is against 
the currently popular idea. 
 
38. I take a “who cares?” attitude when making a decision. 
 




34. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
35. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
36. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
37. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
 
38. 1       2        3          4            5 
 
39. 1       2        3          4            5 
Please mark one for each item: 
a. Rank: SGT___  / SSG___ / SFC___ / MSG ___ / 1SG___/  LT___ / CPT___ 
b. Gender: Male ___ / Female ___  
c. Time in current position: ____years____months 
d.  Appropriate school for position:  
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Appendix B – Methodical Decision-Making Process (Decision Making – OC/T Survey #2) 
 
DIRECTIONS:   
♦ Read and understand the following consent statement.   
I understand that by returning this questionnaire, I am giving my informed consent as a 
participating volunteer in this study.  I understand the basic nature of the study and agree that any 
potential risks are exceedingly small.  I also understand the potential benefits that might be 
realized from the successful completion of this study.  I am aware that the information is being 
sought in a specific manner so that no identifiers are needed and so that confidentiality is 
guaranteed.  I realize that I have the right to refuse to participate and that my right to withdraw 
from participation at any time during the study will be respected with no coercion or prejudice. 
 
Read each of the items carefully.  Decide to what 
extent you believe each statement is true of your 
organization today. 
Rate each statement on a scale of 1-5. 
Circle the number that best describes your organization 
as it exists today. 
 
 
Not          Sometimes         Always 
True             True                 True 






1.  High commanders’ concept and intent two levels up 
were understood. 
 
2.  All specified and implied tasks were identified during 
mission analysis. 
 
3.  All constraints and limitations placed on the unit were 
identified during mission analysis. 
 
NOTE:  If you rated a 1 or 2 for questions 1-3, have the 
leader answer question 1 and 2 on the back. 
 
SITUATION ANALYSIS & COA DEVELOP  
 4.  All of the elements of METT-T were used to analyze the 
unit’s situation. 
 
5.  All of the elements of OCOKA were used to analyze the 
terrain. 
 
6.  Leader used defined steps when developing their 
courses of action. 
 
7.  Subordinate unit’s task and purpose were determined. 
 
NOTE:  If you rated a 1 or 2 for questions 4-7, answer 
question 3 and 4 on the back. 
 
COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS 
8.  The unit’s proposed course of action was war-gamed 
against the enemy’s most probable course of action. 
 
9.  The unit’s proposed course of action was war-gamed 
against the enemy’s most dangerous course of action. 
NOTE:  If you rated a 1 or 2 for questions 8-9, answer 
question 5 on the back. 
 
1.  1         2         3          4           5 
 
 
2.  1         2         3          4           5 
 
 







4.  1         2         3          4           5 
 
 
5.  1         2         3          4           5 
 
 
6.  1         2         3          4           5 
 
 










9.  1         2         3          4           5 
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 COURSES OF ACTION COMPARISON 
10.  The unit’s course of action was chosen by comparing 
factors identified during mission analysis. 
 
NOTE:  If you rated a 1 or 2 for question 10, answer 





10.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
Note: The following is the backside of the Decision Making-OC/T Survey #2. 
 
MISSION ANALYSIS 






2. During mission analysis, did you determine all of the following items: specified & implied 






SITUATION ANALYSIS &  COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT 
3. As you analyzed your situation, did you use METT-T and OCOKA properly?  How successful 











COURSES OF ACTION ANALYSIS 
5. How did you analyze these courses of action?  Did you use the Army’s war-gaming technique 






COURSES OF ACTION COMPARISON 
6. How did you select which course of action to chose? 
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Appendix C – Closed Leadership Style Behaviors (Leader Style – Unit & OC/T Survey #3) 
 
DIRECTIONS:   
♦ Read and understand the following consent statement.   
I understand that by returning this questionnaire, I am giving my informed consent as a 
participating volunteer in this study.  I understand the basic nature of the study and agree that any 
potential risks are exceedingly small.  I also understand the potential benefits that might be 
realized from the successful completion of this study.  I am aware that the information is being 
sought in a specific manner so that no identifiers are needed and so that confidentiality is 
guaranteed.  I realize that I have the right to refuse to participate and that my right to withdraw 
from participation at any time during the study will be respected with no coercion or prejudice. 
 
Read each of the items carefully.  Decide to what 
extent you believe each statement is true of your 
organization today. 
Rate each statement on a scale of 1-5. 
Circle the number that best describes your organization 
as it exists today. 
 
 
Not          Sometimes         Always 
True             True                 True 




In your opinion: 
1. Participation in-group discussions is always 
encouraged. 
 
2. The group leader states his/her opinion at the 
beginning of the meeting. 
 
3. The group leader does not encourage opinions different 
from his/her own. 
 
4. The group leader emphasizes the importance of 
reaching a wise decision. 
 
5. I feel that I am allowed to add my perceptions during 
group meetings. 
 
6. Participation in group discussions is never encouraged.
 
7. At the beginning of the meetings, the group leader does 
not state his/her opinions. 
 
8. The group leader encourages opinions different from 
his/her own in group discussion. 
 
9. The group leader does not emphasize reaching a wise 
decision. 
 
10. I feel that I am not allowed to add my perceptions 
during group meetings. 
1.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
2.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
3.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
4.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
5.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
6.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
7.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
8.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
9.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
10.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
Please mark one for each item: 
a. Rank: SGT___  / SSG___ / SFC___ / MSG ___ / 1SG___/  LT___ / CPT___ 
b. Gender: Male ___ / Female ___  
c. Time in current position (job): ____years____months 
d.  Appropriate school for position:  
       Yes completed___ / Partially completed___ / None ___     
© 2001 Sheryl J. Johnson and Charles H. Allen  
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Appendix D – Symptoms of Groupthink (Group Characteristics-Unit Survey #3, back side) 
 
DIRECTIONS:   
♦ Read and understand the following consent statement.   
I understand that by returning this questionnaire, I am giving my informed consent as a 
participating volunteer in this study.  I understand the basic nature of the study and agree that any 
potential risks are exceedingly small.  I also understand the potential benefits that might be 
realized from the successful completion of this study.  I am aware that the information is being 
sought in a specific manner so that no identifiers are needed and so that confidentiality is 
guaranteed.  I realize that I have the right to refuse to participate and that my right to withdraw 
from participation at any time during the study will be respected with no coercion or prejudice. 
 
Read each of the items carefully.  Decide to what 
extent you believe each statement is true of your 
organization today. 
Rate each statement on a scale of 1-5. 
Circle the number that best describes your organization 
as it exists today. 
 
 
Not          Sometimes         Always 
True             True                 True 




In your opinion: 
1.  I keep silent about my misgivings on decisions. 
 
2. I assume that members who remain silent during group 
discussion are in agreement with the majority. 
 
3. Disagreement among ourselves is encouraged. 
 
4. Differences of opinion are expressed freely. 
 
5. Group members joke and laugh about potential 
dangers that may result from the group’s decision. 
 
6. I objectively weigh the moral and ethical consequences 
of the group’s decisions. 
 
7. I take great pains to be objective during decision-
making. 
 
8. I stereotype others outside my group. 
 
9. I feel empowered to question the wisdom of the 
majority. 
 
10. I engage in vigorous debate in our group decision-
making process. 
 
11. Differences of opinion are expressed freely. 
 
12. The group members are prevented from challenging 
the leader or the majority. 
 
13. I believe we are realistic in assessing the group’s 
vulnerabilities. 
 
14. The moral and ethical consequences of the group’s 
decisions are never taken into account. 
1.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
2.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
3.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
4.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
5.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
6.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
7.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
8.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
9.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
10.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
11.  1       2         3          4           5 
 




13.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
14.  1       2         3          4           5 
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15. Group members explain away potential problems 
created by the group’s decisions. 
 
16. Group discussion avoids stereotyping other individuals 
and groups. 
 
15.  1       2         3          4           5 
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Appendix E – Symptoms of Groupthink (Symptoms of Defective Decision-Making#3) 
 
DIRECTIONS:   
♦ Read and understand the following consent statement.   
I understand that by returning this questionnaire, I am giving my informed consent as a 
participating volunteer in this study.  I understand the basic nature of the study and agree that any 
potential risks are exceedingly small.  I also understand the potential benefits that might be 
realized from the successful completion of this study.  I am aware that the information is being 
sought in a specific manner so that no identifiers are needed and so that confidentiality is 
guaranteed.  I realize that I have the right to refuse to participate and that my right to withdraw 
from participation at any time during the study will be respected with no coercion or prejudice. 
 
Read each of the items carefully.  Decide to what 
extent you believe each statement is true of your 
organization today. 
Rate each statement on a scale of 1-5. 
Circle the number that best describes your organization 
as it exists today. 
 
 
Not          Sometimes         Always 
True             True                 True 




In your opinion 
1. The unit did not do a complete survey of alternatives. 
 
2. The unit conducted a complete survey of their 
objectives. 
 
3. The unit failed to examine risks of their preferred 
course of action. 
 
4. The unit failed to reappraise their initially rejected 
alternatives. 
 
5. The unit conducted a poor mission analysis. 
 
6. The unit showed favoritism toward a preferred course 
of action? 
 
7. The unit failed to work out contingency plans for their 
mission. 
 
8. The unit conducted a complete survey of alternatives. 
 
9. The unit conducted an incomplete survey of their 
objectives. 
 
10. The unit performed an adequate risk assessment 
before each mission. 
 
11. Initially rejected alternatives were always reappraised. 
 
12. The unit performed an adequate mission analysis. 
 
13. Favoritism was never shown when selecting a course 
of action. 
 
14. Contingency plans were planned for each operation. 
1.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
2.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
3.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
4.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
5.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
6.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
7.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
8.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
9.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
10.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
11.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
12.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
13.  1       2         3          4           5 
 
 
14.  1       2         3          4           5 
© 2001 Sheryl J. Johnson and Charles H. Allen 
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